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Abstract
North Korea said in January 2019 that it was exploring
ways to engage the human rights issue. This was a
much welcomed announcement because the issue must
be addressed in order for the two countries to reach a
formal, comprehensive peace agreement and the lifting
or easing of unilateral sanctions. This study utilizes
framing as an analytical tool to examine how the North
Korean human rights discourse is framed in the United
States for the purpose of identifying the salient rights‐
based issues covered in two traditional media outlets,
namely, the Washington Post and New York Times.
Next, it reframes the discourse using a coding schema
based on the convergence of the human rights, human
security, and non‐traditional security discourses. A
reframing of the discourse highlights how the
universalist–particularist debate in the traditional
rights‐based literature masks the underlying issues of
the rights problem. A combination of the traditional
rights‐based discourse and the masking of the issues contributes to a disconnect in the way in which North Korea
has been engaged in the past. Therefore, a reframing of
the discourse using the convergence of the human rights,
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human security, and non‐traditional security discourses
could open new pathways for engagement.
KEYWO RDS
Australia, Human rights, North Korea, United Nations, United States

1 | INTRODUCTION
Of all the issues that the Americans consider when confronted with world news, human rights
is of the deepest concern due to their civic sensibilities of freedom instilled into them from their
earliest education. This issue elicits strong emotive reactions from the U.S. population, ranging
from calling policymakers to take action to organizing public protests and demonstrations to
bring attention to what are perceived to be abhorrent human rights violations in whatever country such transgressions occur. For some time, North Korea has been one such country that has
been called out by U.S. policymakers as an egregious violator of human rights. U.S.
policymakers have taken bipartisan action ranging from public laws to resolutions calling for
North Korea to respect and protect the human rights of its people as they are enshrined in
the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights.1 They have consistently asserted that
human rights must be a key element in negotiations between the United States and North Korea
and incorporated as part of any comprehensive agreement between the two countries. Additionally, the U.S. executive branch cannot waive existing sanctions without certifying to the U.S.
Congress that North Korea has made significant improvements toward human rights including
the release of and accounting for abductees, family reunification, reform of the prison and labor
camps system, and decriminalizing political expression. Therefore, when the UN Special
Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana reported on January 14, 2019, that North Korea was exploring
ways to engage the human rights issue, there was a sense that maybe this time around the North
Korean government was more serious about pursuing peace and integrating itself into the global
community (Hotham, 2019).
The United States has attempted to engage North Korea on the human rights issue in the
past, but there has been little success in getting the government to make substantial progress
that would satisfy the requirements of the U.S. Congress. This is in large part because of the
1

Resolutions passed by the House and/or Senate do not have the force of law. However, they express the sense or concern of Congress or of specific congressional representatives. Only public laws have the force of law. The actual public
laws that have been passed focusing on human rights include the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108‐383, 118 Stat. 1287 (2004); the North Korea Child Welfare Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 2432 (2012); and the North Korea
Sanction and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, 130 Stat. 93 (2016). Specific congressional resolutions expressing the
sense of Congress of the House of Representatives include H. Res. 109‐108, 2003; H. Con. Res. 168‐109, 2005; and H.
Con. Res.234‐110, 2007. These resolutions were passed by all of the House. Congressional resolutions sponsored by
one or more congressional representative but not passed by or expressing the sense of the entire body of Congress
include H. Res. 3573‐108, 2003; S. Res. 1903‐108, 2003; S. Res. 4052‐109, 2006; H. Res. 3650‐110, 2007; H. Res. 705‐
111, 2009; H. Res. 1980‐111, 2009; H. Res. 5350‐111, 2010; S. Res. 1416‐111, 2009; H. Res. 1321‐112, 2011; H. Res. 673‐
113, 2013; H. Res. 204‐114, 2015; S. Res. 180‐114, 2015; H. Res. 866‐115, 2018; H. Res. 861‐115, 2018; H. Res. 976‐115,
2018; H. Res. 4140‐115, 2017; H. Res. 5435‐115, 2018; S. Res. 2047‐115, 2017; H. Res. 6094‐115, 2018; S. Res. 481‐115;
and S. Res. 3142‐115, 2018. The majority of those cited resolutions were bipartisan; that is, they were sponsored by both
Democrats and Republicans. However, in 2018, there were more Democrats than Republicans who sponsored resolutions. This suggests that human rights are not a partisan issue and of great concern to the majority of the U.S. Congress.

RUDOLPH

3

diverging philosophical perspectives that the two governments have on human rights. The U.S.
government adopts a universalist discursive approach to human rights and gives priority to
sociopolitical rights. A universalist rights‐based discourse rejects the particularist critique that
first, second, and third generations of rights enshrined the UN Declaration of Human Rights
are “Western”; argues that all member states of the UN have been using a rights‐based discourse
since 1948; and posits that all rights are universally applicable to each individual irrespective of
nationality and culture. Particularists argue that the rights‐based discourse of the international
community is western centric; dispute the importance afforded to and applicability of all types
of rights and give priority to the right to development (socioeconomic rights); and adopt a cultural relativist position on the implementation of rights in either a region or a country. North
Korea posits that human rights are conditional and shaped by national context and the domestic
reality on the ground; collective rights are above individual rights; and welfare and subsistence
rights (socioeconomic rights) have special importance (Son, 2017, p. 142). The government
discourse does not outright reject the claim that there is a universal rights discourse. In fact,
it recognizes that there are certain universal principles to which all states can agree but
prioritizes socioeconomic rights over sociopolitical rights. The United States does not recognize
socioeconomic rights. Furthermore, North Korea's human rights discourse is more in line with
non‐traditional security discourse that is prevalent within the human rights debate in the Asia
Pacific region, whereas the United States has not adopted the use of the non‐traditional security
discourse in the rights debate. Therefore, there is likely to be little progress on engagement
between the two countries toward the rights issue in the absence of a discursive shift within
the U.S. public discourse on North Korean human rights issue.
U.S. public discourse on the human rights issue in North Korea has not been examined
previously. Therefore, this study seeks to utilize framing as an analytical tool to examine how
the North Korean human rights discourse is framed for the purpose of identifying the salient
rights‐based issues covered in two traditional media outlets, namely, the Washington Post and
New York Times. Next, it reframes the discourse using a coding schema based on the convergence of the human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses. A
reframing of the discourse as such highlights how the universalist–particularist debate in the
traditional rights‐based literature masks the underlying issues of the rights problem. This study
makes the argument that a combination of the traditional rights‐based discourse and the
masking of the issues contributes to a disconnect in the way in which North Korea has been
engaged in the past. Therefore, a reframing of the discourse using the convergence of the
human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses could open new
pathways for engagement and increase the changes for successful dialogue.
Section 2 provides an in‐depth discussion of the methodological approach adopted and outlines the main theoretical assumptions underpinning the analysis. The study draws on assumptions derived from the framing, human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security
literature. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the human rights literature and introduces
the human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses nexus. The human
rights discourse has witnessed a convergence with the human security and non‐traditional
security discourses in the international community in the period beginning in 2012. However,
the U.S. discursive approach to engagement with North Korea remains rooted in the traditional
right‐based approach. Section 4 reports on and discusses the findings. It concludes by re‐
examining human rights in the U.S. national security debate and outlines a new pathway for
engagement with North Korea on the rights issue. Finally, the study concludes by arguing that
how we frame and discuss North Korea matters for addressing issues such as human rights.

4
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2 | METHODOLOG Y
Framing refers to the process for constructing an interpretation or set of interpretations from a
set of events, which entails interpreting and evaluating a central organizing idea, issue, problem,
or phenomenon under investigation (Carlyle, Slater, & Chakroff, 2008; Evans, 2010; Mello &
Tan, 2016; Sheehan, 2013). Reframing refers to the process of reorganizing the frame within a
specific discursive framework. Both framing and reframing are analytical tools used by scholars
and media professionals to make sense of the world and the issues affecting society, politics, culture, and communication. Framing scholars in the fields of political science and policy studies
tend to focus on how both the media and politicians frame issues, actors, and countries in order
to understand how events transpired or explain policy action (see Entman, 2003). Some policy
scholars use framing to understand the perceptual limits to policymakers' actions in a particular
policy environment. This study utilizes framing as an analytical tool to examine how the North
Korean human rights discourse is framed for the purpose of identifying the salient rights‐based
issues covered in the media. Next, it reframes the discourse using a coding schema based on the
convergence of the human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses. A
reframing of the discourse as such highlights how the universalist–particularist debate in the
traditional rights‐based literature masks the underlying issues of the rights problem. This study
makes the argument that a combination of the traditional rights‐based discourse and the
masking of the issues contributes to a disconnect in the way in which North Korea has been
engaged in the past. Therefore, a reframing of the discourse using the convergence of the
human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses opens new pathways
for engagement. This section outlines the theoretical underpinnings, describes the analytical
process, and discusses the methodological limitations of the study.

2.1 | Theoretical underpinnings: Discourse, framing, and the
right‐based discursive approaches
Given that there has been no study to date on what is being attempted, the theoretical underpinnings are rooted in and guided by the assumptions present in the existent literature on
framing, human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security. In the framing literature,
there are five main assumptions that are often seen to be present. Each of these assumptions
deals specifically with media coverage. They are supplemented by another five theoretical
assumptions extracted from the existing literature on human rights, human security, and non‐
traditional security. These assumptions focus on the human rights debates, the type of rights prioritized, and the evolution of the rights discourse to include human security and non‐traditional
security discourses. All of the assumptions are discussed in relation to the study in the remainder of this subsection, whereas the literature on human rights, human security, and non‐
traditional security is discussed in more detail in Section 3.
Discourse plays a central role within both the framing and reframing processes (Evans, 2010;
Iannarino, Veil, & Cotton, 2015; Sheehan, 2013). First, it is the dominant medium through
which frames are cast and conveyed to an audience. Second, it sets the discursive parameters
around which the public and policymakers form, understand, and discuss their perceptions.
According to Jervis (2017, p. 3), “perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand.” Lastly, framing
affects and influences the mindset of all who are exposed to it, especially in consistent and
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repetitive salvos such as occurs regularly in mainstream media news outlets. The mainstream
media is the primary mode of dissemination of views regarding events in either direct ways
through framing in op‐eds or indirectly through the less obvious but ever present pejorative
tones and news angles that are focused on in what is known as “objective journalism.” True
objectivity is an ideal that cannot be achieved through limitations with language and points
of view. Even a simple recounting of an event is structured by whatever personal or institutional
biases that bare influence on the reporter, editor, advertisers, or policymaker for that outlet.
Consequently, the media discourse tends to be the focus of scholars in the fields of communication, policy, and political science.
Media discourse is considered to be “an authoritative version of reality, a way of knowing”
(Barker‐Plummer, 1995, p. 305; Evans, 2010). Therefore, the first assumption is that media plays
a central role in framing issues and influencing the perceptions of policymakers and the public,
which in turn affects their actions (Blackstone, Cowart, & Saunders, 2017; Carlyle et al., 2008;
Evans, 2010). Policymakers also use the coverage as a way in which to gauge public opinion
on issue areas (Evans, 2010; Peksen, Peterson, & Drury, 2014). This assumption implies that
the first step in understanding both issues and perception is to examine the media discourse.
The second assumption found in the framing literature asserts that partisan viewers or
readers of media tend to gravitate toward content that agrees with their perceptions and avoid
content that disagrees with their perception (Blackstone et al., 2017, p. 602). However, according
to these scholars, these kinds of viewers and readers comprise a minority. The implication
derived is that the majority of viewers or readers accept the discursive frames constructed and
conveyed in the traditional media outlets and only a minority reject them for bias (either their
own or that of the outlet). The third assumption shows that media coverage leads the public to
understand issues from a particular perspective or frame thereby making certain elements more
salient and “increasing the chance that certain schema of interpretations is evoked” (Carlyle
et al., 2008, p. 158). For instance, the U.S. public is likely to understand the issues on North
Korea such as human rights from the perspective or frame conveyed in the traditional media
outlets. This inference is supported by Dalton, Jung, Willis, and Bell (2016, p. 524), who
highlight traditional media as being central to how the international community understands
the discourse around North Korea.
The fourth assumption is that frequent coverage can result in the adoption of a particular
frame including the reproduction of stereotypes irrespective of counterframes. This implies that
the traditional rights‐based discursive approach will continue to define how the rights issue is
understood by the U.S. public in the absence of a shift in the discursive approach used to frame
the issue. A shift in the discursive approach to one that corresponds to the convergence of the
human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses will highlight the complexity of the rights issue. As Dalton et al. (2016) highlight, media coverage of North Korea
tends to be overwhelmingly negative and sensationalized. According to the framing literature,
negative coverage leads the public to perceive the other as “bad” or “evil” and the consequence
of which serves to delegitimize, marginalize, or demonize actors (Carlyle et al., 2008; Dalton
et al., 2016; Evans, 2010; Saleem & Mian, 2014). It also contributes to the public calling for
action. Complex coverage, on the other hand, can lead the public and policymakers to distance
themselves from the issues, leaders, or countries or to adopt a more neutral position. More
complex coverage of the rights issue that includes North Korea's discourse and its actions taken
to address human rights is likely to reduce the emotive responses to the rights violations and
open the door to policymakers for a more in‐depth discussion on alternative ways to address
the issue.

6
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The fifth assumption from the framing literature is that media attention to human rights
abuses increases and, in some instances, reinforces negative perceptions of the country while
increasing empathy toward the victims (Chung, 2014; Peksen et al., 2014). As media attention
to the rights issue increases, so too does public mobilization and support for action toward
the abusing country. This means that U.S. policymakers are more likely to take action against
North Korea as there is increased media coverage and public calls for action on the rights issue.
However, support for and the actual action taken will be tempered by national strategic security
objectives (Forsythe, 2002). National security will continue to trump rights in the denuclearization negotiations, but the rights issue is likely to remain a significant factor in the implementation of a final peace agreement and for satisfying members of Congress on lifting some of the
unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. government.
The sixth assumption, which is derived from the human rights literature, asserts that human
rights in North Korea have been a central concern for the U.S. public and Congress since the
1970s and for the global public and international community since 2004. Between the years of
2004 and 2014, the United States and the international community sought to bring attention
to and link the human rights and security issues in framing the discourse on North Korea.
Denuclearization, missile developments, weapons of mass destruction, provocative actions,
and support for terrorism (i.e., sharing or selling weapons technology to either state sponsors
of terrorism or non‐state actors designated by the U.S. government as terrorist groups) tended
to be the main focus of the “security issues” in the linking process. Security deprivation issues
that are commonly associated with human rights were omitted. This is largely explained by
continued salience of the traditional rights‐based discursive approach to human rights.
The seventh assumption posits that the framing of the human rights discourse on North
Korea is centered within the larger universalist–particularist debates, with the United States
placing greater emphasis on sociopolitical rather than socioeconomic rights. As Forsythe
(2002) highlights, the United States places rhetorical emphasis on universal human rights in
foreign policy but practices a particularist interpretation of human rights in its own adherence
to the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The international community and the European
Union in particular recognize all types of human rights—first‐, second‐, and third‐generation
rights. This implies that the United States and North Korea talk at rather than to one another,
and thus, the international community may be a more appropriate actor for engaging the North
Korean government.
The eighth assumption, which is derived from the human rights literature on North Korea,
avers that North Korea has been actively using human rights discourse in its public discourse.
North Korea recognizes the general principles of the UN Declaration of Human Rights but
places emphasis on socioeconomic rights and adopts a particularist interpretation of rights
toward implementation. Its discursive approach therefore is philosophically at odds with the
traditional rights‐based discursive approach of the United States However, both the United
States and North Korea converge on the particularist interpretation to the implementation of
rights. The particularist interpretation, as discussed in more detail in Section 3, asserts that
national governments must factor in both the domestic context and social, economic, and
political development in their application of a rights‐based policy. Greater emphasis on socioeconomic rights rather than sociopolitical rights in North Korea's rights problem is likely to
reduce the government's hostility to engagement. It is in this context that the convergence of
the human rights and human security discourses becomes relevant. The human security discourse places greater emphasis on socioeconomic rights and development than the traditional
human rights‐based discourse.
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The ninth assumption is that North Korea's discourse on socioeconomic rights is similar to
China's discourse on human rights and human security. According to Breslin (2015), China situates human rights and human security within the non‐traditional security paradigm. In this
discourse, socioeconomic rights must be prioritized over sociopolitical rights because economic
security is the underlying dimension that transcends all of the dimensions of human security.
Human insecurity therefore is an existential threat to the state's national security. The state
must be the source for providing the individual with security rather than being a source of insecurity. China's discourse thus transforms the state's obligation, thereby making human security
a moral responsibility for governing officials. This discourse opens the door to dialogue with
North Korea on the rights issues that falls within the dimensions of human security.
Finally, the last assumption is gleaned from the literature focusing on North Korea's non‐
traditional security threats. According to Park (2013) and Suh (2013), non‐traditional security
issues such as economic security, food security, and environmental/energy security have a more
immediate impact on North Korea's national security, and the way to reduce the legitimacy
threat they pose to regime stability is to help North Korea with its non‐traditional security issues
(Park, 2013; Suh, 2013). North Korea has consistently argued that emphasis on the human
rights issue by the United States and international community is designed to foment regime
instability. For the most part, its argument has been dismissed by the United States as an excuse
to avoid focusing on the rights problem. However, when the argument is examined within the
context of the human security and non‐traditional security discourses, there is some credence to
North Korea's concerns. Those concerns must be factored in when thinking about how to
engage the government.

2.2 | The analytical process
Traditional media outlets tend to be the main source of information for the U.S. public on foreign policy‐related issues due to the perception that they are more credible (Iannarino et al.,
2015). The two traditional outlets selected for analysis in this study were the Washington Post
and the New York Times. Both of the outlets are within the top 10 most read newspapers by
the U.S. public, the top five of the newspapers read internationally, and the most commonly
used by communication, political science, and policy studies scholars. They are also easily accessible to academics via the LexisNexus (a.k.a. Nexus Uni) database. A sample of 398 articles was
selected using “North Korea” and “human rights” as the key search terms,2 and of them, 186
covered the Bush administration period and 212 covered the Obama administration period.
The two administrations were selected because they represent the two major parties and due
to the fact that each president served two terms and also because of the variance identified in
each administration in the framing of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in Schofer's (2015)
study (discussed in the next section). Appendix A contains an alphabetized list of the article
titles retrieved from the database. All the data were examined over a specified period of time
for the purpose of observing patterns both inductively and deductively. This subsection outlines
the six‐phased analytical process used in the study.
In the first phase of analysis, the articles were analyzed inductively to understand how the
human rights discourse was framed within and across the two presidential administrations
2

Some of the articles only contained references to human rights or North Korea, whereas others mentioned North Korea,
but their focus was on human rights in China. The articles selected specifically mentioned human rights in relation to
North Korea.
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and to identify the salient human rights issues. Next, the articles were coded to assess the target
audience, the salient human rights issues‐at‐play according to type of deprivation and in relation to the existing human rights debates, the dimensions‐at‐play, the response or solution to
the problem, and the patterned variations within the policy environment. The target audience
refers to who was the main target of the article. For example, if the article discussed domestic
politics or highlighted the need for policymakers or the government to act toward the specific
issues, then it was coded as domestic. It was coded as international if the article discussed the
international community or specific members of the community (including bilateral relations
with the United States) or called for the international community to act on specific issues.
The domestic audience category was further examined to identify whether it was the policy
community or the human rights, non‐governmental organization (NGO), or activist community
who was the main actor referenced or cited in the discourse. Both the domestic and international target audience categories were assessed to determine whether the discourse was either
political or neutral. Political coverage refers to references where a position is adopted such as
being one sided (not mentioning or referencing North Korea's position or interest), using
language that attempts to delegitimize, marginalize, or demonize international actors, or
supporting, opposing, or calling for action toward specific issues. Neutral coverage refers to references where human rights abuses were mentioned but the language used did not attempt to
delegitimize, marginalize, or demonize North Korea or the government, where there was simply
a reporting on meetings between the United States and North Korea and congressional hearings, or notification of the findings in the U.S. Department of State's country reports on human
rights and religious freedom around the world.
In the third phase of analysis, the salient human rights issues and their corresponding
subissues were identified inductively and then placed into the respective human rights and deprivation categories based on the human rights debates. Civil and political issues were placed in
the civil and political rights category, whereas economic, cultural, and social issues were placed
in the economic, political, and social rights categories. Security issues were treated as a separate
category because the heart of the debate in the literature on human rights and non‐traditional
security is regarding whether the blurring of the line between human rights and security issues
helps or hinders efforts to bring awareness to or action against violators of human rights abuses.
The political, economic, social, cultural, and security deprivation categories correspond to the
UN's use of deprivation as measure of development and their common use in the conflict studies
literature to understand domestic, regional, and international stability. Table 1a provides an
overview of the coding categories by type of rights, deprivation, and their corresponding issues
and subissues.
In the fourth phase of analysis, the articles were coded for and categorized by dimensions
(ideological, psychological, political, military, or religious/cultural) to assess the perceived
threat to North Korea's ideological, psychological, political, military, and cultural security.
The dimensions correspond to the categorical prisms used in the foreign policy decision‐making
literature and the literature focusing on operational planning in military science. Each article
was coded based on reference to keywords (Table 1b).
In the fifth phase of analysis, articles were examined inductively and coded according to the
proposed responses or solutions (e.g., dialogue, sanctions, behavioral change, regime change, or
regime transformation) to assess the range of policy actions that might be supported by the U.S.
public and policymakers within the context of human rights issues. Within the coded responses
or solutions mentioned, references to regime change or regime transformation were specifically
looked for because of North Korea's claims that the United States engages in hostile activity by
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Coding categories for types of rights, deprivation, and their corresponding issues

Type of rights

Type of deprivation

Specific issues

Civil and political rights

Political deprivation

Nature of governance including access, rights such
as freedom of expression and due process,
corruption, lack of transparency, and
politicization of human rights
Freedom of movement; class‐based system, caste
system—inequality; other

Social deprivation
Economic, social, and
cultural rights

Economic deprivation

Human deprivation
Cultural deprivation
Security rights

TABLE 1B

Security deprivation

Food security; economic mismanagement and the
public distribution system; labor conditions and
policy; corruption; migration (China's policy,
refugee/asylee/defect issues; human trafficking,
smuggling, sexual exploitation, forced marriages)
Health, education, and welfare (well‐being and
poverty)
Religion including freedom of practice and
discrimination; culture of mistrust
Criminal justice system (general and its lack of
independence and transparency), criminal code
(arrests, charges, interrogation tactics, and
investigative procedures), sentencing, solitary
confinement, and border security policies;
treatment of inmates including lack of rights, ill‐
treatment by guards, nature of punishment for
behavioral violations, and inadequate access to
health care; camps, detention centers, and totally
controlled zones and their conditions; corruption
among guards and local government officials;
kidnapping/abduction

Coding categories by dimension and keywords

Dimension

Keywords

Ideological

Communism, stalinism, kimism, and political liberalism

Psychological

Legitimacy, nazism, genocidal, inhumane, evil

Cultural

Culture

Political

Governance system, leadership, political culture

Military

Military

raising the human rights issue, ostensibly for the purpose of fomenting instability and
facilitating regime change.
In the sixth phase of analysis, the findings were tabulated within and across the two presidential administrations to identify patterned variations and frame convergence and divergence.
Patterned variations within the policy environment refer to the context in which human rights
were discussed (e.g., in relation specific to U.S. bilateral relations or U.S. foreign policy in general). Frame convergence refers to where there is overlap in the two administrations by target
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audience, type of rights, deprivation, issues, dimensions, policy action, and patterned variation.
Divergence refers to where there is variance in the frames and between the two administrations.
Both convergence and divergence were assessed in relation to the policy environment in order
to better understand the relationship between the variables within and across the two administrations. All the findings were triangulated with both the theoretical assumptions outlined in
Section 2.1 and the inferences made in the studies cited in Section 3.

2.3 | Limitations of the methodological approach
There are several limitations to the methodological approach adopted in this study. They center
on framing as a tool and methodology, the media sources selected for data analysis, the small
sample size of the articles and their representativeness, and the qualitative nature of the study.
First, framing has limited ability in practice to move support for a contentious issue in one
direction or the other or on policy preferences (Bechtel, Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Helbing,
2014). However, the authors do highlight that it does impact partisan viewers and individuals
with less knowledge on the framed issues. Partisan views are more likely to adopt the party line
on a contentious issue regardless of their pre‐existing beliefs on knowledge to reinforce existing
partisan orientations. Individuals with less knowledge on the issue are likely to be persuaded by
frames outside of partisan considerations. This study does not factor in partisanship nor does it
examine the demographics of reader viewership of the two traditional media outlets selected for
analysis. Human rights are a contentious issue, and there is research suggesting that partisanship plays a role in whether supporters are likely to side with one party over another on the
issue in an era of deep partisanship such as is present in the United States at the time of this
writing. There is also research suggesting that the human rights issue transcends party lines
and that there is only variation on policy preferences. Second, framing as a methodology (also
referred to in the literature as frame analysis) may capture interpretative frames and shed light
on the discursive context within which they are constructed but the inherent bias in the process
itself raises issues of variability, reliability, and validity of the findings. Frames become static
once they are captured in time and are dependent on the selected sources used for data analysis.
This implies that use of alternative sources could result in varying counterframes and thus
contradictions in the findings. Existing research examining variance in frames constructed by
mainstream media and alternative media highlights this problem. Counterframes were not
focused on this study, which implies that the findings are only valid within the context of the
interpretive framework and the media sources used in and the temporal boundaries imposed
on the study.
Relatedly, the selection of only two traditional mainstream media outlets is problematic for
several reasons. First, existing research has highlighted the profit‐driven nature of traditional
mainstream media in contrast to the non‐profit‐driven nature of alternative media. Second,
all media tend to publish articles based on episodic or crisis events and use sensationalized discourse strategically to increase viewership and the temporal and geospatial span in which a
story runs. All media have harnessed the use of social media to expand both the temporal
and geospatial life of a story. This study does not factor in how social media are used by the
selected outlets nor examine the impact of the framing of human rights media discourse on
the transnational rights advocacy or policy networks. Third, there is an ideological bias given
that both the Washington Post and New York Times are considered to be more liberal media outlets in the United States. A more robust study would take into consideration local and state
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media as well as other national news media to assess the strength of how the issues are framed
and whether there is what the framing literature calls a cascading frame effect. Fourth, the
small sample pool size and the representativeness of the different media outlets limit the
generalizability of the study. Additional research is needed to increase the reliability of the
preliminary research conducted in this study.
Finally, the qualitative nature of the study opens the door to criticisms of subjectivity and
bias. Issues can be viewed from multiple perspectives, and the frames themselves represent specific patterns of interpretation of both the source and the researcher. Despite these limitations,
the study does make a significant contribution to the existing literature and the ongoing negotiations between the United States and North Korea. This is the first study to the researcher's
knowledge that examines the framing of the U.S. public human rights discourse on North
Korea. It is timely in a practical sense because North Korea has recently stated that it is considering ways to engage the human rights issue.

3 | H U M A N R I G H TS , H U M A N S E C U R I T Y , AN D
NON ‐TRADITIONAL SECURITY: A BRIEF LITERATURE
REVIEW
Egregious abuse of human rights in North Korea is an issue that no one could rationally dispute,
not even the North Korean government (Song, 2011). According to Oh (2015, pp. 285–286), such
transgressions have long been the purview of the Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN
General Assembly and are an area of concern for human rights specialists. The global public did
not express concern until 2004 (Hwang & Kim, 2006). Between 2004 and 2014, human rights
activists across the globe including those in South Korea and the United States joined forces
with transnational advocacy networks to campaign against human rights violations. State and
non‐state actors were, and still remain, divided over the type of rights to focus on for advocacy,
tactical approaches (activism or humanitarianism), and the means for compelling North Korea
to protect its citizens.
Within the existing literature, the strategic and tactical debates correspond to the larger
philosophical or normative debates on the “universality” or “particularity” of human rights
(Avonius & Kingsbury, 2008; Jacobsen & Bruun, 2005; Song, 2011).3 Universalists posit that
the conceptions of human rights including civil and political rights (first‐generation rights), economic, social, and cultural rights (second‐generation rights), and conceptions of peace and a
sustainable environment (third‐generation rights) are neither culturally specific nor “Western”
in their orientation and therefore universally applicable (Avonius & Kingsbury, 2008, p. 21).
Moreover, they argue that since the time of the adoption of the UN Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948, states have engaged in debates on each type of rights thereby cultivating a universal human rights discourse. Critics of the universalist position claim that the human rights
put forward are “Western” rather than “universal,” particularly with the emphasis on sociopolitical over socioeconomic rights and the “individual as a person” over the “individual as a citizen of the state.” Also, they argue that the rights cannot be universally applied because of
variance in local interpretation. Some scholars have rejected the Westernization argument but
recognize that “every culture has its own ways and strategies to identify and fight oppression”
3

Because a large body of human rights literature exists on this debate, only a summary of the universalist and culturalist
debates are presented in this study.
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(Avonius & Kingsbury, 2008, p. 10). Particularists call for a culturally and developmentally
specific interpretation of rights and the application of the type of rights to be contextually
determined. Most of the discourse within this debate focuses on sociopolitical rather than socioeconomic rights. Of course, there are variations in the dominant paradigmatic debates.
A third approach emerged, which attempts to bridge the two types of human rights discourse.
It recognizes that there are general principles to which all states within the international community can agree but posits that implementation requires states to take into consideration
social, political, economic, and cultural context and economic, human, and social development
of society in their interpretation of rights (Chart, 2005). Song (2011) advocates an approach to
human rights discourse on North Korea that is similar to this approach. North Korea has been
actively using human rights discourse in its public documents and trying to impose its own perceptions of human rights on domestic and international policies since 1945 (Song, 2011, p. 2).
Ideologically, North Korea's discourse is influenced by Confucian ideas, Marxist‐Leninism,
and Juche Ideology. Confucian ideas such as a virtuous ruler, citizens duties in return for
granted rights, and the importance of social roles and duties of both the ruler and the ruled
for collective unity and social harmony were used by Kim Il Sung to shape thinking about
the nature of social relations within Korean society despite. Marxist‐Leninism influenced North
Korea's interpretation of collective interests and socioeconomic rights, whereas Juche Ideology
influenced its interpretation of the individual as a citizen of the state. An amalgam of these
influences was integrated into “Our‐Style” Human Rights in 1995. Our‐Style rights are characterized by “citizens duties and loyalty to the party and the leader in return for the protection of
basic subsistence rights and security, and the conception of rights are granted, not entitled
inherently when a person is born” (Song, 2011, p. 146). The discourse may be contrary to the
liberal human rights discourse used by U.S. policymakers that places emphasis on sociopolitical
over socioeconomic rights, but it is not completely at odds with the overall development of international human rights discourse and the convergence of the human rights, human security, and
non‐traditional security discourses in the post‐2012 period (Breslin, 2015).
Human security entails the ability of the state to provide its population with economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (Gomez & Gasper, 2012). Economic security refers to having a stable
income or other resources now and in the future. Food security refers to having access to a sufficient quantity of affordable, nutritious food. Health security refers to access to resources that
minimize public health events that endanger the public, and, for an individual, it refers to
access to resources to ensure that he or she can live as healthy as possible. Environmental security refers to the reduction of threats to the environment, including repairing the damage done
because of conflict or war or environmental/natural disasters. Personal security refers to the
protection from personal harm. In this framework, an individual should be able to live free from
harm by another and be able to call for and summons assistance. Community security refers to
both preventing and protecting society from crime and promoting human development. Political security refers to being free from any sort of political oppression. According to Park (2013),
the human security areas deemed most critical for North Korea, at least in the short term, are
economic security, food security, and environmental/energy security. These are areas where
the U.S. Congress has authorized aid to North Korea in the past.
Non‐traditional security discourses include the issues of terrorism, extremism, transnational
organized crime, irregular migration, human trafficking, and human security. China's discourses on human rights and human security are rooted in the non‐traditional security paradigm (Breslin, 2015). The evolution of its discourse corresponds to the convergence of peace,
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security, development, and human rights discourses at the UN in the post‐2012 period. Therefore, it is argued here that a reframing of the U.S. discourse on human rights in North Korea
to correspond to the evolution of human security and non‐traditional security discourses may
open the door to dialogue with North Korea on the human rights issue. According to Jae‐Jung
Suh (2013), non‐traditional security issues have a more immediate impact on the people of
North Korea and impinge on the state's security policies, thereby making it and its people as
well as the region more insecure. Human insecurity, he posits, can exacerbate national
insecurity, and the way to reduce that legitimacy threat is to help North Korea by focusing on
the non‐traditional security issues.
Heretofore, framing has not been the focus of existing scholarship examining the relationship
between human rights and national security within the context of U.S. foreign policy. However,
Morgan Schofer does highlight the explanatory power of framing in his study examining the
relationship in U.S. counterterrorism legislation during the Bush and Obama administrations.
According to Schofer (2015), how specific human rights norms were framed by President Bush
in contrast to President Obama help to account for the differences in U.S. policy where there
was a conflict between human rights and national security. Schofer argues that framing was
successfully used by President Bush to overcome the human rights hurdle in U.S. foreign policy,
where President Obama was unsuccessful in reframing the human rights and national security
tradeoff when attempting to reassert the importance of human rights in U.S. policy. When
looking specifically at the discourse they used, President Bush successfully blurred the “human
rights” and “security” discourses to reframe the debate, thereby ensuring that national security
trumped human rights within counterterrorism policy. President Obama attempted to reassert
the distinction by drawing on the traditional human rights discourse used by U.S. Congress in
an attempt to facilitate specific counterterrorism policy changes (in particular on U.S. policy
transfer and treatment of Guantanamo Detainees). The U.S. Congress did not support his
attempt at policy change despite the discourse used and the role human rights policy has played
in U.S. congressional efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy. Thus, it can be seen how framing is
important because frames shape how the U.S. public and policymakers perceive North Korea
and whether they call for policy action on its human rights violations as they are perceived from
each camp. A reframing of the human rights discourse may provide for greater opportunities to
engage North Korea on the human rights issue.

4 | FRAMING THE HUMAN RIG HTS DISCOURSE ON NOR TH
KOREA
4.1 | Coverage by target audience
The total media coverage between the years 2001 and 2017 primarily targeted the domestic
rather than the international community and was overwhelmingly neutral. However, there
was variation between the two administrations by target audience (Figures 1–3).
During the Bush administration period, the domestic coverage primarily focused on human
rights in the context of either U.S. foreign policy in general (i.e., the role of human rights in U.S.
policy) or more specifically, within the context of U.S.–North Korean relations. It targeted the
policy community, subject matter specialists, and the U.S. public. A minority of the media coverage focused specifically on human rights in North Korea as a policy issue. In this coverage, the
target audience was the human rights community. International media coverage was more
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Media coverage by domestic and international target audience

varied. Forty‐two percent of the media coverage focused on the human rights issue within the
context of Inter‐Korean relations, U.S.–South Korea relations, or specific developments within
South Korea such as domestic tensions. Thirty‐seven percent of the coverage focused on U.S.
relations with the international community or specific actors within the international community and their relations with North Korea or in response to U.S. foreign policy. Finally, 21% of
the international media coverage focused on U.S.–China relations and China's treatment of and
policy toward North Korea defectors, refugees, asylees, and economic irregular migrants,

FIGURE 2

Domestic media coverage by target audience. NGO, non‐governmental organization
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FIGURE 3
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Tone of media coverage

China–North Korea security cooperation toward irregular migration, and the human rights
community's critique of Chinese migration/refugee policy.
A majority of the coverage under the Obama administration targeted an international audience rather than the domestic audience. This finding confirms the assumption that between the
years 2004 and 2014, the United States sought to bring greater attention to the human rights
issue in the international community but also finds that the real turning point in terms of framing occurred during the Obama administration. The international coverage focused primarily on
bringing attention to and generating global awareness of the human rights abuses in North
Korea, presenting defector narratives, calling for the international community (and the UN in
particular) to act, and highlighting the actions undertaken by the UN. Non‐state actors from
the human rights community including activists and subject matter specialists and policymakers
who advocated for the centrality of human rights in dialogue with North Korea were primarily
targeted in the coverage. The domestic coverage primarily focused on and debated whether
human rights should be a foreign policy agenda item in U.S.–North Korean relations, with some
members of Congress calling for policy action. Both the debate and the calls occurred amidst
coverage of the Americans who were detained for illegal entry and committing crimes under
North Korean law. The U.S. policymaking community and subject matter specialists were the
primary targets of the coverage.
To conclude the discussion of the media coverage by the target audience across the two
administration periods, the domestic audience was the primary target audience in the framing
of the discourse, and it was primarily the U.S. foreign policy community rather than the
human rights community that was targeted. This information highlights the importance of
human rights to U.S. foreign policy. The coverage targeting the international community
was primarily concerned with bringing attention to the human rights issue rather than calling
for action to be taken by specific actors in the international community. This finding opens
the door for either the international community or certain actors within the international
community to engage in dialogue with North Korea on the human rights issue. Coverage of
the human rights discourse is seen to have been primarily neutral rather than being politicized despite the claims of North Korea that the issue was politicized and the general assumption found in the literature that coverage tends to be overwhelmingly negative. However, the
finding on the tone of coverage suggests that it may vary by the policy issue. For instance,
Dalton et al. (2016) demonstrate that coverage on the nuclear issue remains primarily
negative.
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4.2 | Coverage by the human rights debates, salient issue areas, and
dimensions
The debates in the human rights literature primarily focus on whether the first, second, and
third generation of rights are universal and on the primacy of the first‐generation rights (i.e.,
sociopolitical rights) over second‐generation rights (i.e., socioeconomic rights). As Song (2011)
highlighted, North Korea has been using human rights discourse in both its public statements
and policy documents since 1945. North Korea's discourse recognizes the universal nature of
human rights discourse but disputes the primacy of sociopolitical rights over socioeconomic
rights. Forsythe (2002) highlights the use of a universalist human rights discourse and advocacy
of sociopolitical rights in the international human rights regime by the United States as well as
its preference for a particularist approach to human rights when it involves the application of
the UN Declaration of Human Rights at home. Both North Korea's and the U.S. approaches
to implementation are, therefore, more in line with the third approach to the human rights
debate. However, it also confirms that there is a disconnect in the way in which human rights
are discussed within the context of bilateral relations.
A framing of the human rights discourse concerning North Korea between 2001 and 2017 reinforces the salience of the universality of the human rights discourse in the media coverage but
diverges from the universalist's emphasis on sociopolitical rights (Figure 4). The socioeconomic rights
discourse trumped the sociopolitical rights discourse once the security discourse was removed. As will
be recalled from Section 2, the security issues were treated as a separate category in order to get at
another debate in the literature on the linking of the human rights discourse, human security
discourse, and non‐traditional security discourse in the post‐2012 human security paradigm (Breslin,
2015). The findings suggest that the security discourse became an important form of discourse in the
human rights debate on North Korea between 2009 and 2017. Also, when looking across the
administrations, it was far more significant than the sociopolitical rights discourse and almost equal
to the socioeconomic discourse. The salience of the socioeconomic discourse throughout the years
reinforces the assumption that a reframing of the human rights discourse on North Korea could open
the door to dialogue given North Korea's emphasis on socioeconomic rights in the rights debate.
An examination of the types of rights emphasized in the human rights discourse on North
Korea finds that economic deprivation and security deprivation are the major underlying
challenges to the North Korea human rights issue (Figure 5). As the chart highlights, economic

FIGURE 4

Media coverage by the human rights and non‐traditional security debates
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Media coverage by types of rights and deprivation

deprivation was prominent in both administrations, but there was more of an emphasis on it in
the media coverage during the Bush administration than the Obama administration. Security
deprivation was more salient during the Obama period. Although there was less emphasis on
security deprivation in the Bush period, it still trumped political deprivation.
A breakdown of the economic, political, and security deprivation categories by their corresponding economic, political, and security issues reinforces the convergence of the human
rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses (Table 2).
Food security and migration are two of the rights subissues underlying economic deprivation,
and they were notable within and across the administrations. Ireson (2013) discusses North Korea's
food insecurity and highlights how the Public Distribution System (PDS) was only able to provide
food security up until the 1980s. By 2000, the public no longer depended on the PDS, particularly
in the areas that were the hardest hit during the famine of the 1990s (Kim, 2014). According to both
authors, modifications in agricultural technology and institutions are needed to increase production
and reduce the national security threat that food insecurity poses to the regime and region. The PDS
and economic mismanagement are two salient subissues contributing to economic deprivation in
the media coverage. They are also related to the set of migration subissues. Irregular migration from
North Korea to China and other regional countries is largely a byproduct of the lack of both food and
economic security rather than from the issues underlying political deprivation. However, as will be
discussed shortly, there is overlap in the economic and political deprivation categories.
The prominent subissues of migration are refugees and human trafficking, smuggling, sexual
exploitation, and forced marriage (Figure 6). Park (2013, pp. 57–74) highlights that the nexus
between food insecurity, economic insecurity, and gender insecurity contributes to these
subissues. Economic insecurity has led to what Park refers to as the “feminization” of labor
migration, with there being a disproportionate number of women who migrate irregularly for
economic reasons rather than for political reasons. As a June 5, 2018, briefing report issued
by Human Rights Watch highlights, North Korean women are more vulnerable to human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The remaining
two subissues pertain to China's policy toward accepting North Korea “refugees,” whom the
government defines as economic irregular migrants, and North Korea's policy on the irregular
migrants. The United States and international community have pressured China to not repatriate the irregular migrants because of the criminal penalties these migrants would be subjected
to upon their return to North Korea. However, from the Chinese government's perspective, a
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Media coverage of the economic, political, and security issues and their subissues
Bush
(2001–2009)
% of
coverage

Obama
(2009–2017)
% of
coverage

Total % across
administrations
(2001–2017)

Issues

Subissues

Economic issues

Food security
Economic management and the
public distribution system
Labor conditions and policy
Corruption
Migration

41
14

46
15

43
14

4
0
41

8
4
27

5
1
40

Political issues

Nature of governance including
access, rights such as freedom
of expression and due process,
corruption, lack of
transparency, and the
politicization of human rights

91

11

10

Security issues

Criminal justice system (general
and its lack of independence
and transparency), criminal
code (arrests, charges,
interrogation tactics, and
investigative procedures),
sentencing, solitary
confinement, and border
security policies
Treatment of inmates including
lack of rights, ill‐treatment by
guards, nature of punishment
for behavioral violations, and
inadequate access to health
care
Camps, detention centers, and
totally controlled zones and
their conditions
Corruption among guards and
local government officials
Kidnapping/abduction

12

42

33

31

18

22

42

30

34

0

5

3

15

5

8

change in policy toward the irregular migrants would pose a larger national security threat due
to a potential increase in the influx of irregular North Korean migrants. China's policy of repatriation is governed by two agreements, namely, the Ministerial Cooperation Protocol for the
Work of Maintaining National Security and the Social Order and the Border Areas between
North Korea and China (Chanlett‐Avery, Manyin, & Nikitin, 2018). For the U.S. government
and the international community, China's policy contravenes the UN Refugee Convention, of
which it is a signatory. In practice, however, the situation is often not so drastic because the
policy is applied selectively and targets primarily irregular migrants who have stayed in the
country rather than moving on to a third country through one of the diplomatic missions
excepting petitions for asylum.
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Breakdown of the media coverage on the migration subissue

The salient political issues relate to the nature of the governance system in North Korea and,
in particular, freedom of expression and due process, corruption, lack of transparency, and the
politicization of human rights. Although these are primarily sociopolitical issues, the context in
which media covered the lack of due process, corruption, transparency, and politicization of
human rights highlights how they intersect with the economic and security deprivation. Media
coverage on the lack of due process focused on the treatment of repatriated economic irregular
migrants and the North Korea's unwillingness to provide access to and information following
their repatriation. According to Margesson, Chantlett‐Avery, and Bruno (2007, p. 10), punishments for returnees depend on “whether or not an individual committed crime in China, what
the person has done since leaving North Korea, and what he or she was trying to escape from.”
It is believed that returnees face punishment ranging from a few months of “labor correction” to
execution. Media coverage of corruption focused on actions undertaken by border security,
prison officials, and local government officials. Haggard and Noland (2009, pp. 1 and 4) note
that high levels of discretion with respect to arrest, sentencing, and abusive treatment of prisoners help to facilitate pervasive corruption among officials who extort money from those seeking to avoid the penal system. Media coverage of the lack of transparency focused on the opaque
nature of North Korea's criminal justice system. Zook (2012, p. 131) argues that “legal reform
may be the most important factor ensuring North Korea's stability and reintegration.” Finally,
North Korea's claim of the politicization of human rights was noted in the media coverage when
the subissues were raised by the United States and the international community. As mentioned
earlier, North Korea has consistently argued that U.S. attention to the issue is designed to facilitate regime change whereas U.S. officials have claimed otherwise. Hallet (2006, p. 73) asserts
that despite claims by U.S. officials, the government's attention to the human rights issue
emerged simultaneously with attempts to use asylum policy to promote political goals and
country‐specific legislation to facilitate political change in “rogue states.” The problem is not
per se whether the rights issue is politicized as much as it is the fact that emphasis on political
deprivation in the rights discourse masks the underlying issues thereby resulting in a breakdown in dialogue between the two countries. This gap opens the door for the international
community to engage North Korea on human rights in the absence of a shift in the U.S. position
on the rights issue and the discourse it uses for engagement. A shift in the U.S. position is
possible if it focuses more on security deprivation rather than political deprivation.
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Security deprivation was the second most significant category across the rights and deprivation categories after isolating the security discourse from the political issues (Figure 6). However, there was variation across the administration periods. In the Bush administration period,
camps, detention centers, and totally controlled zones and their conditions were the most
recurrent subissues. Those subissues were the second most salient issue during the Obama
administration period. Treatment of inmates, and so forth, was the second salient issue for
the Bush administration period and third salient area for the Obama administration. Finally,
the criminal justice system was the third salient subissue during the Bush administration
period and the second most salient issue area in the Obama administration period. Despite
the variance in the administration periods, the overall importance of the security rights discourse over the sociopolitical rights corresponds to the normative shift within U.S. rights discourse, which gives priority to security over the rights of an individual as a citizen (Schofer,
2015). An emphasis on security deprivation could possibly reduce the perceived politicization
of human rights by North Korea that occurs with emphasis on political deprivation (Figure 7).
Emphasis on political deprivation exacerbates North Korea's perceived threat to its political,
psychological, and ideological security and, as a result, narrows the type of dialogue on the
human rights issue (Figure 8). However, there was overlap in all three categories. Table 3 provides a breakdown of each type of security by the key references in the Bush and Obama administration periods. The findings substantiate North Korea's perceptions that the United States
politicizes the human rights issue and, by continually raising it, aims to foment regime instability. The nature of the discourse itself characterizes North Korea as the “other” and questions the
regime's legitimacy and political ideology. Dalton et al. (2016) find similar results when they
analyze the public construction of North Korea in Australian media. Consequently, there are
limits to the policy preferences that policymakers can choose from when it comes to dealing
with North Korea on the rights issue.

FIGURE 7

Media coverage on security deprivation
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Media coverage by dimension

Media coverage by type of security and key references

Type of security
Political security

Key references
Nature of the
governance system

Government or leader

Political culture

Bush
(2001–2009)
% of
coverage

Obama
(2009–2017)
% of
coverage

“Communist state,” “Stalinist
48
state,” “totalitarian nature of
the state,” “tyrannical regime,”
“despotic regime,” and “police
state”
“Despotic leader,” “Murderous
39
leader,” and negative/critical
references
“Repressive,” “Undeveloped,” in 13
a “State of Decay,” and absent
of political legitimacy

13

55

32

Ideological security

Regime ideology

Stalinism
Communism
Kimism
Political liberalism

52
48
0
0

44
34
13
13

Psychological
security

Othering—Good vs.
evil

Evil or “member of the Axis of
42
Evil”
Parallel to Nazi Germany
37
Genocidal and inhumane
0
Misperception
11
Questioning the legitimacy of the 0
state

0

Legitimacy

38
15
0
46

4.3 | Media coverage of policy preferences
Peksen, Peterson, and Drury (2014, p. 855) find that although there is increased pressure on U.S.
policymakers to act and a greater likelihood of action being taken as the media pays more
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attention to human rights violations, policy preferences are conditioned by U.S. strategic ties to
potential targets and the strategic importance of the targeted actor to U.S. foreign policy objectives. U.S. policymakers are more likely to act against non‐allies who are not strategically important to U.S. foreign policy objectives. They are more likely to act on human rights violations
despite objections by the U.S. executive when there are increased calls for action by the U.S.
public. The U.S. public's perception of human rights violation in a country is shaped by the
U.S. media, and the latter tends to pay closer attention to violations committed by authoritarian,
non‐strategic allied regimes. U.S. policymakers have acted against North Korea for its perceived
human rights violation over the objection of the U.S. executive. Human rights are likely to be an
issue raised in any final peace agreement with North Korea. Therefore, an understanding of the
policy preferences that find support within the U.S. media coverage of the human rights discourse on North Korea becomes an important starting point for contemplating the development
of a strategy to engage North Korea on the human rights issue (Table 4).
Diplomacy, engagement, and better bilateral relations between the United States and North
Korea and the adoption of a multilateral approach to engagement with North Korea on the
human rights issue were the two most salient policy preferences in the media coverage. In
the Bush period, there was constant reference to the need for bilateral relations, whereas normalization of relations was debated in the Obama period. The debates, however, concentrated
on whether conditions should be imposed within the context of denuclearization rather than
for human rights violations. This finding suggests that there is some leeway on the opening of
relations with North Korea so long as there is dialogue on issues such as human rights that
are central to key policy actors. Only a small minority of support existed for regime change,
whereas a majority rejected this option. Regime transformation is another story, particularly
given that the second set of salient policy preferences focuses on North Korea's policy reform
(to be discussed shortly). This finding is important because of the perceived threat of human
rights to North Korea's political and psychological security. Finally, support for a multilateral
approach to the human rights issue emerged in the Obama period as a salient policy preference.
However, given the overall percentage of references to such an approach in relation to the other
policy preferences, there is likely to be support among U.S. policymakers across the political
parties for a multilateral approach.4 This finding opens the door to the idea that the international community's engagement with North Korea may satisfy U.S. policymakers and limit public calls for making human rights a bilateral issue in U.S.–North Korean engagement on and
implementation of final peace agreement.
As will be recalled from Table 2, the second set of policy preferences that found support in
the media coverage included economic development assistance, policy reform in the areas of
the economy, and criminal justice sectors and targeted sanctions. The United States has been
one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance to North Korea since 1995 providing over
$1.2 billion (Chanlett‐Avery et al., 2018; Kim, 2014; Manyin & Nikitin, 2014). U.S. assistance has
primarily targeted food, energy, and health insecurity. However, as of 2012, the United States
has all but halted its aid due to congressional restrictions on the type of assistance that can
be provided. Prior to 2016, the U.S. Congress limited the U.S. executive's ability to use the provision of aid as an inducement for denuclearization negotiations and has also required
4

Part 2 of this reframing project focuses on analysis of congressional documents for the purpose of identifying the key
issues, the discourse surrounding them, and the debates over policy preferences. Part 3 focuses on congressional and
executive order sanctions for human rights violations in general and on North Korea more specifically. These projects
are being incorporated in a forthcoming book.
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TABLE 4
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Media coverage by policy preferences

Policy preferences

Bush (2001– Obama (2009– Total % across
2009) % of
2017) % of
administrations
coverage
coverage
(2001–2017)

Dialogue, diplomacy, engagement and better bilateral
28
relations, and normalization of relations (with or without
conditions)

22

24

Opposition to isolation, confrontation, and support for an
easing of tension by the international community

14

2

7

Support for regime change, behavioral change, and/or
political transformation by the activist community

14

0

5

Economic and development assistance (food and energy
security)—with conditions and without conditions, and
reform of the domestic economy

24

7

13

Need to work with North Korea on human rights by
adopting a long‐term humanitarian approach to aid
rather than tying it to human rights activism

2

0

6

Transparency of the governance and criminal justice
system, greater access to information to promote
awareness and compliance with the UNTOC, reform of
the penal system, and develop and prison amnesty
program

0

12

7

Need to bring attention to the human rights issue and its
linkage with security issues supported by the activist
community

16

0

1

Adopt a multilateral approach toward engagement on
human rights that promote transparency and greater
awareness and access to information on human rights
within the country

0

39

24

Need to work with North Korea on human rights by
adopting a long‐term humanitarian approach to aid
rather than tying it to human rights activism

2

0

1

Targeted sanctions on those responsible for human rights
abuses

0

18

11

Abbreviation: UNTOC, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

monitoring and controls to be implemented for any type of emergency humanitarian assistance.
North Korea has not implemented legislation nor given permission for the implementation of
the type of monitoring and controls needed to satisfy the congressional requirement. Instead,
North Korea has requested the United States to provide economic development assistance
rather than humanitarian assistance; this request has been resisted due to mistrust over the
North Korean government's intentions and congressional concern over how the funds will be
used (Kim, 2014; Manyin & Nikitin, 2014). However, according to Manyin and Nikitin (2014),
the U.S. executive branch does have some leeway in providing economic development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but any long‐term assistance would require
congressional approval, changes in congressional legislation, and economic policy reform in
North Korea. As Chanlett‐Avery et al. (2018) highlight, Kim Jung‐Un has pursued economic
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policy reform, but it falls short of the type of reform that would satisfy congress. Moreover, the
North Korean Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 and the Korean Interdiction and
Modernization of Sanctions Act of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act impose further restrictions on economic development assistance by limiting trade to food,
medicine, and other humanitarian and neglected goods, prohibiting financial transactions and
investment, and opening the door to sanctions to foreign financial institutions that trade with
North Korea.
As Peksen et al. (2014) highlight, the U.S. government has consistently imposed sanctions on
non‐strategic allies for human rights violations. U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea has
primarily targeted the country and its officials for nuclear proliferation and engaging in illicit
activities. Up until recently, sanctions have not been imposed on government officials for
human rights violation. North Korean officials were sanctioned for the first time for human
rights violations in December 2018 (King, 2018). There is a reason to suspect that additional
sanctions may be imposed by the U.S. Congress in the future for North Korea's human rights
violations in the absence of serious economic and criminal justice reform including the release
of political prisoners. Future sanctions are likely to target those who oversee or who are responsible for the violations (e.g., officials responsible for oversight of the provinces where the abuses
occur or where the prisons are located). Additional sanctions are likely to produce a negative
reaction by the North Korean government. However, the U.S. executive branch's hands are tied
on lifting or restricting sanctions on North Korea imposed by U.S. congressional legislation
(Chanlett‐Avery et al., 2018). Waivers or an easing of sanctions on a recipient country only have
been granted in the past in the name of national security.

4.4 | U.S. national security, human rights, and a strategy for
engagement
Cha and Kang (2004) highlight the emotional and ideological context that divides U.S. politics
on North Korea into two main camps: the hardliners and the moderates. The hardliners prefer
isolation and containment, whereas the moderates argue for engagement, and the hardliners
refer to the moderate's approach pejoratively as appeasement, whereas the latter dismiss the
former's approach as being too hawkish. This ideological divide is further complicated when
factoring in legislative and executive differences. The executive, irrespective of political party,
has preferred engagement of varying degrees over full isolation and containment, whereas the
U.S. Congress has attempted to challenge the executive branch (again, irrespective of party)
on its approach to North Korea through legislation on aid, trade, sanctions, and human rights
and conducting hearings on a variety of issues.
North Korea does not make a distinction in its public discourse in response to actions taken
by the different branches of the U.S. government, nor does it seem to attempt to understand
how political context influences the policy environment. The U.S. executive branch must take
the U.S. Congress' concerns into consideration when it not only negotiates agreements with
North Korea but also contemplates implementation of any agreements. As Cha and Kang
(2004) highlight, the 1994 Agreement broke down during the implementation phase, and one
of the most important arguments made by the U.S. Congress at the time was that the agreement
had not been approved. President Clinton had replied to the U.S. Congress that approval was
unnecessary because it was not a formal agreement. Then Congress moved to impose legislation, which contributed to its breakdown.
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Any formal peace agreement will require the U.S. Senate's approval, and funding for and
oversight of its implementation will require majority support within both houses of the U.S.
Congress. Therefore, the issues and concerns of Congress are important, and human rights
are one issue that has been championed by and used to check the U.S. executive branch in
the U.S. foreign policymaking process. The only time when human rights have taken a backseat
in U.S. foreign policy debates is when it comes to U.S. national security. The U.S. executive
branch has separated the denuclearization issue from the human rights issue in its approach
to engagement, arguing that it is in U.S. national security interest to engage North Korea on
denuclearization. Congress has supported this argument to a large extent across the administrations, but there has been variation over the years on what it would accept to propel the negotiations forward. However, because Congress has linked the two issues in the existing legislation,
North Korea will have to engage in dialogue on the human rights issue if it wants a final peace
agreement to be implemented and unilateral sanctions lifted. The questions then become: Who
should engage North Korea? Which issues should be the focus of engagement? And, given
North Korea's past response to attempts to engage it on the rights issue, how should it be
engaged?
The United States is not per se the best actor to engage in dialogue with North Korea over the
human rights issue based on the findings. There is a disconnect between the official discourse
on the human rights issue and how it is framed to the U.S. public via the media. As the discussion above highlighted, North Korea gives preference to socioeconomic rights over sociopolitical
rights, whereas the United States emphasizes sociopolitical rights in its official discourse and
does not recognize socioeconomic rights in practice. The point of convergence between the
United States and North Korea on the human rights issue lies in the non‐traditional security discourse, thereby making the security issues a foundation upon which dialogue could start. However, congressional restrictions limit the ability of the United States to actually assist North
Korea on addressing the security issues underlying and coexisting with the human rights issue.
Therefore, the international community becomes the best actor to engage in dialogue with
North Korea. As the findings highlight, the U.S. public discourse opens the door to the international community. The international community's engagement with North Korea may be
sufficient to satisfy U.S. policymakers' concerns over human rights.
North Korea's engagement with the international community on human rights has been limited to the submission of communiques and reports prior to the release of the UN Commission
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Korea's report in 2014 (European
Parliament, 2016; Ferenczy, 2017; Office of the High Commission on Human Rights [OHCHR],
2017; Son, 2017; Song, 2011). It was only after the report that the government opened a two‐
track approach to engagement, one with the UN and the other with the European Union. At
the UN, high‐level government officials openly discussed human rights and engaged in dialogue. For example, North Korea's foreign minister visited the UN General Assembly for the
first time in 15 years, whereas the ambassador of permanent mission to the UN publicly
discussed the UN Commission of Inquiries recommendation that North Korea be referred to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) at an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations
(Son, 2017). It also accepted the recommendations of the 2009 Universal Periodic Review, submitted alternative reports and published books on human rights in its country, and ratified the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. More recently, North Korea and the OHCHR cosigned the UN strategic framework 2017–2021, which integrates a human rights‐based approach for the UN agencies
operating in the country (OHCHR, 2017). With the European Union, North Korea sent officials
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in 2014 to see about resuming dialogue that has been suspended in 2013. The last round of dialogue held in 2015 focused on nonproliferation, regional stability and security, respect for
human rights, the humanitarian situation, and European Union–Democratic People's Republic
of Korea relations (Ferenczy, 2017). North Korea has rejected formal dialogue with the United
States on human rights to date.
Though recognizing their limitations since the media coverage was limited to U.S. media outlets, the findings highlight that a change in the discourse used and the issues that are focused on
may elicit less of a hostile response from North Korea. It seems clear given the cultural and historical context that more emphasis placed economic and security deprivation would be more
effective to achieving a common ground for dialogue. The European Union may be the best
actor to engage North Korea on the human rights issue given its recognition of socioeconomic
rights in a majority of the member states' human rights discourses, the nature of its critical
engagement policy, and willingness to engage the government on its own terms and within a
narrative that is not perceived to overtly hostile (European Parliament, 2016). Australia, China,
and Russia may be the best actors for engaging North Korea on the security issues. Australia has
provided a significant amount of security assistance and training to states to deal with non‐
traditional security issues in the Asia Pacific region, and it is an actor that enjoys good relations
with the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress in particular. China and Russia do not have a
good relationship with U.S. policymakers, but they have the respect and trust of the North
Korean government. They have also provided security assistance and training to North Korea's
security forces. Non‐traditional security issues have been given priority by all three countries.
Finally, China's discourse on human rights security is situated within the non‐traditional
security paradigm; thus, if the issues raised are within that context, it becomes a lead actor
for helping North Korea to address the human rights issue.
The salient issues underlying the human rights issues fall into the economic deprivation and
security deprivation categories. Based on the findings, the main issues needed to be addressed
and that are not inconsistent with North Korea's human rights discourse include food security,
migration, human trafficking, smuggling, criminal justice system and penal reforms, and law
enforcement and correctional officer training. Corruption is the only sociopolitical rights issue
that is essential to facilitating success in addressing the abovementioned issues. Regarding food
security, the World Food Program and the UN have been the dominant actors and have been, to
date, effective in their role. However, Manyin and Nikitin (2014) make a strong case for an
increased role for NGOs on addressing this issue given that they seem to have a better relationship with the people and government officials inside North Korea. The European Union also
gives preference to NGOs and civil society actors for the same reason (European Parliament,
2016). Monitoring and control issues are still going to need to be addressed so that there does
not continue to be a donor issue concern. Most of the U.S. humanitarian assistance to North
Korea has gone through the World Food Program. On the issue of migration, Australia, the
International Office on Migration, and International Labor Organization are three key actors.
As studies on irregular migration demonstrate, the keys to reducing irregular migrant flows
and facilitating safe, regular migratory flows are reforming the immigration system and law.
They are both vital to addressing the underlying refugee and human trafficking issues. As
was discussed in the findings, the majority of those who left North Korea in the post‐1995 period
did so for economic rather than political reasons; thus, regardless of whether they are called economic refugees or economic migrants, migration policy and immigration system reform are
essential for addressing the issues. The United States and Australia are key actors for the human
trafficking issue. Although the U.S. Congress limits the type of aid that the U.S. government can
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provide to North Korea, the United States does have a great training program to help states
bring attention to and address human trafficking. U.S. education institutions could potentially
fill a gap in lieu of the U.S. Department of State. Australia has worked with Thailand and other
ASEAN member states to assist in efforts to combat human trafficking. The Australian law
enforcement model may be best suited for North Korea on this issue as well as for training in
law enforcement and correctional facility personnel. On the issues of smuggling and corruption,
China is a key actor. Finally, for criminal justice system and penal reforms, Australia,
Switzerland, and Russia are key actors. Russia has experienced the transition from open to
closed penal systems and continues to operate open, closed, and hybrid correctional institutions.
Switzerland has unique rehabilitation and community integration programs to help inmates
reintegrate into society. This will be important for North Korea because of fear of instability that
would result from a release of a significant number of the imprisoned population and the inability of the domestic economy to absorb them back into the labor market. North Korea is also
familiar with Switzerland. Finally, at the heart of the criminal justice system reform is law.
Again, for the reasons already cited, Australia could be a key actor.
In this discussion, there has been a lot proposed; however, at the end of the day, all success
hinges on whether North Korea is willing to fully engage the international community. It is in
North Korea's national security interest to engage, not just because human insecurity threatens
its long‐term stability but also to neutralize one of the issues that may prevent the U.S. executive
branch from finding support within the U.S. legislature for a formal peace agreement and the
lifting of unilateral sanctions. International engagement of North Korea has been very public
in the past thus resulting in a string of vehemently defensive responses from North Korea. This,
in part, is because of the conflict in the discourses used. Perhaps, this time, a concerted, multipronged quietist approach that breaks the issues down according to key actors and presented
within the context of human rights, human security, and non‐traditional security discourses
nexus would be in the best interest of everyone.

5 | CONCLUSION
To conclude, this study sought to examine how the human rights discourse is framed within the
Washington Post and New York Times between 2001 and 2017. As was highlighted, framing is
important because it shapes how the U.S. public and policymakers perceive the human rights
issue in North Korea. The framed discourse primarily targeted the domestic rather than the
international community, and, in particular, it targeted the U.S. public generally and U.S.
policymakers more specifically. This finding is important because the U.S. Congress has given
human rights a priority in the U.S. domestic–foreign policy nexus since the 1970s. The human
rights issue is likely to be raised as a concern by the U.S. Congress in any formal peace
agreement that is proposed by the U.S. executive branch.
Although North Korea has thus far refused to fully engage the United States and the international community on the human rights issue, it is in its national security interest to do so if it
truly seeks a formal peace agreement with the United States and to prevent future instability
that might result from the underlying economic and security deprivation issues. A reframing
of the human rights discourse utilizing the human rights, human security, and non‐traditional
security discourses nexus highlights the salience of socioeconomic rights in the country's human
rights problem. The United States does not recognize socioeconomic rights, whereas the international community does, but it has adopted the non‐traditional security discourse in the rights
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debate on counterterrorism and other non‐traditional security policy issues. This opens the door
to the international community to engage North Korea on the economic deprivation issues and
provides an area of convergence in the rights discourse for the United States and North Korea to
eventually engage in dialogue on the security deprivation issues.
As Dalton et al. (2016) discuss, the international community needs to find a new way to
engage North Korea in order to facilitate peace. A quietest, multipronged approach to engagement was proposed here, which breaks the issues down by deprivation categories and key
strategic actors. The proposed approach is rudimentary and requires far more analysis than
what has been conducted in this study. However, it seeks to spark debate on creating a new
path to engage North Korea. As Jae‐Jung Suh (2013) highlights, the best way to reduce the
legitimacy threat posed by human insecurity is to help North Korea by focusing on its non‐
traditional security issues. Non‐traditional security has been given a priority in the security
and rights agenda in the surrounding countries in the Asia Pacific and has been promoted
by key actors such as China, Russia, and the United States in regional and international fora.
A reframing of the rights discourse and the argument for a new approach to the North Korea
human rights issue are not meant to exclude the rights community, who has long advocated
for the protection of victims who have been abused. Rather, what was attempted here was
simply to try to find a way to gently engage North Korea on an issue that is likely to be raised
in any final peace agreement. As the studies on framing and discourse highlight, how we
frame issues and the way in which they are discussed matter for shaping perceptions and
influencing behavior. However, when each side begins to talk at rather than to one another,
then no one can be helped, the issues cannot be resolved, and peace will continue to remain
elusive.
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